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Abstract  
 
Billions of animals worldwide are used annually for human consumption. The agricultural industry enjoys 
a high-level of state protection because of its role in supplying the populace with food, and in turn, 
supporting the nation’s security. In Europe and the United States, activists make similar challenges to 
status quo animal industry practices: activists use video cameras to expose animal abuses and share their 
findings with the public. Several U.S. states with strong animal agricultural industries have passed “ag-
gag” laws aimed at outlawing many of these activities, including filming undercover and entering 
slaughterhouses under false pretenses. Finding these laws restrict free speech and impede efforts to gather 
evidence for whistle blowing operations, activists have challenged these laws in U.S. federal district 
courts. This paper examines three of these lawsuits, including two in which activists won rather “easily” 
under favorable U.S. free speech jurisprudence. Next, I compare these cases to three free speech and 
expression cases brought by animal activists in Europe. I use this comparison to argue that even well 
written and strategically crafted “ag-gag” laws are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny in the future 
because U.S. free speech jurisprudence exists to protect against the very purpose of ag-gag laws: 
government-led silencing of speech at the request of a powerful industry group.  
 
Keywords: First Amendment; freedom of expression; ag-gag.  
 
 
Resumen - Matanza silenciosa: Cómo las restricciones en la libertad de opinión y de expresión mantienen 
escondidos los abusos a animales y reprimen el activismo por el bienestar animal en Europa y Estados 
Unidos. 
 
Miles de millones de animales en todo el mundo se utilizan anualmente para el consumo humano. La 
industria agrícola goza de un alto nivel de protección estatal debido a su papel en el suministro de alimentos 
a la población y, a su vez, a la seguridad de la nación. En Europa y los Estados Unidos, los activistas hacen 
desafíos similares a las prácticas de la industria animal del status quo: usan cámaras de vídeo para exponer 
los abusos a los animales y compartir sus hallazgos con el público. Varios estados de EE.UU. con 
importantes industrias agrícolas y ganaderas han aprobado leyes "ag-gag" destinadas a prohibir muchas de 
estas actividades, incluida la filmación de instalaciones y la entrada a mataderos con falsos pretextos. Al 
encontrar que estas leyes restringen la libertad de expresión y obstaculizan los esfuerzos para reunir pruebas 
que permitan denunciar, los activistas han cuestionado estas leyes en los tribunales de los distritos federales 
de los Estados Unidos. Este documento examina tres de estas demandas, incluidas dos en las que los 
activistas ganaron bastante "fácilmente" bajo la favorable jurisprudencia de la libertad de expresión de los 
EE.UU. A continuación, comparo estos casos con tres casos de libertad de opinión y expresión presentados 
por animalistas en Europa. Utilizo esta comparación para argumentar que es improbable que incluso las 
leyes "ag-gag" bien redactadas y elaboradas estratégicamente resistan el escrutinio judicial en el futuro 
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porque la jurisprudencia de la libertad de expresión de los EE.UU. existe como medida de protección contra 
cada uno de los propósitos de las leyes “ag-gag”: el silenciamiento del discurso dirigido por el gobierno a 
petición de un poderoso grupo industrial. 
 
Palabras clave: Primera Enmienda; libertad de expresión; ag-gag.   
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The agricultural use of animals accounts for the slaughter of over 60 billion land animals annually 
worldwide.1 A dramatic increase in animal production in the U.S. parallels a worldwide trend towards mass 
production. In the U.S. for example, for every one egg producer today, twenty egg producers worked four 
decades ago; the number of pig farmers declined by ninety-nine percent in the same period.2 Presently in 
China people consume four times as much meat as a few decades ago, while livestock drink over half of all 
consumed water.3 China and the U.S. alone are not to blame; the average consumer in an industrialized 
country eats over 180 pounds of meat, 450 pounds of dairy, and twenty-five pounds of eggs per year.4 
To keep up with demand, mass production—fueled by efficiency—is skyrocketing. Crowded 
conditions, increased automation, a single species per warehouse – these conditions characterize the 
industrial systems that today produce over half of the world’s pork and over two-thirds of its poultry, meat 
and eggs.5 These agricultural operations provide harsh environments and crowded conditions. For example, 
both meat and egg chickens have personal space the size of a single sheet of paper; pregnant pigs sit 
confined so tightly they cannot walk one step.6  
Some consumers can recall horror stories of grotesque animal abuse exposed by investigative news 
reports or animal welfare organizations. Through the investigative work of animal activists and the Internet, 
consumers have newfound access to animal abuse findings. Shifts in public opinion within the past two 
decades7 point strongly to increased concern for the welfare of agricultural animals, leading directly to bans 
on battery cages for hens and regulations to improve conditions for pregnant pigs in the European Union and 
a few U.S. states.8  
The public cannot support agricultural animal welfare reforms without information about the state of 
animal welfare inside agricultural operations. Unsurprisingly, an increase in public interest has been met 
with resistance from the agricultural industry, especially in the United States. Under the guise of protecting 
private property and the food industry, the U.S. federal government passed an anti-terrorism act targeting 
animal rights activists. Many states went one step further, criminalizing photography or video filming inside 
animal agricultural operations without the consent of the owner. These laws are commonly referred to as 
“ag-gag laws.”  
In Europe, attempts to expose abuses inside animal operations meet a different challenge: videos 
exposing animal welfare conditions are blocked from broadcast on television and general dissemination. 
Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, all individuals under the jurisdiction of any 
Council of Europe member state have “the right to freedom of expression,” notwithstanding certain 
exceptions. Animal activists in Europe challenge applicable member state criminal and civil code 
regulations as illegal restrictions on their right to freedom of expression. The European Court of Human 
Rights adjudicates these claims, weighing the function of the expression, the penalty, and whether the 
                                                          
1 STUCKI, S., (Certified) Humane Violence? Animal Welfare Labels, the Ambivalence of Humanizing the Inhumane, and What 
International Humanitarian Law Has to Do with It, AJIL Unbound 111 (2017) 277 (https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2017.65); PARK, M., 
SINGER, P., The Globalization of Animal Welfare: More Food Does Not Require More Suffering, Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 
(2012) 122.     
2 SINGER, P., Open the Cages!, The New York Review of Books (May 12, 2016), reviewing PACELLE, W., The Humane 
Economy: How Innovators And Enlightened Consumers Are Transforming The Lives Of Animals (2016), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/05/12/humane-economy-open-the-cages/ [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017]. 
3 SAFRAN FOER, J., Eating Animals (New York 2009) 262. 
4 PARK, M., SINGER, P., supra note 1, at 124. 
5 Id. at 126. 
6 Id.  
7 PARK, M., SINGER, P., supra note 1, at 129. 
8 Id. 126; SINGER, P., supra note 2, at 7; Council Directive 2008/120, of Dec. 18, 2008 Laying down minimum standards for the 
protection of pigs, 2008 O.J. (L 47) (EC); Council Directive 1999/74, of July 19, 1999, Laying down minimum standards for the 
protection of laying hens, 1999 O.J. (L 203) (EC). 
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expression is a fact or value judgement against member states’ duty to protect democracy, speech, privacy, 
and safety.9  
This paper examines three recent cases that challenged U.S. state “ag-gag” laws that restricted access 
to and speech in agricultural operations. Next, I compare these challenges to free speech and expression 
challenges brought by European activists to the European Court of Human Rights, comparing the process 
and rationale these courts use when examining speech and expression restrictions. Finally, I offer possible 
procedural, historical, and contextual reasons for differences in outcomes between Europe and the U.S. In 
conclusion, I suggest that while present day poorly written U.S. “ag-gag” laws are easily challengeable, the 
strict scrutiny jurisprudence of the First Amendment is well-adept to handle any attempt by legislators to 
pass more strategically crafted ag-gag laws in the future. 
 
1. THE FREE SPEECH REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Individual rights have played a central role in U.S. constitutional culture since U.S. independence.10 A 
lack of explicit free speech protections in the U.S. Constitution pushed many framers to advocate for the 
inclusion of a freedom of speech clause in the Bill of Rights.11 Thomas Jefferson warned against the 
“tyranny of the legislatures”12 and many scholars believe the First Amendment sought to limit speech 
restricting laws, like those from England prohibiting “seditious libel” to punish dissent in the colonies, on 
future U.S. soil.13  
These concerns led Congress to word the First Amendment as an explicit limit on the federal 
government.14 Rather than frame the freedom of speech as a positive individual right, a limit commences the 
Bill of Rights. The text of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees: 
 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.15 
 
As a result, the right to free speech is worded as a direct limitation on the government. Justice 
Brennan, an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court famously said that in the U.S. exists a 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.”16 His famous statement clarifies that this commitment goes so far as to include 
“…vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”17 As a 
result, speech is special, well-loved, and vehemently protected. 
Despite these broad protections, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment 
“does not confer an absolute right to speak…whatever one may choose.”18 The core of the First Amendment 
forbids the government’s regulation of speech based on its content or message.19 A content-based limitation 
imposes a legal restriction dependent on the words said, whereas a content-neutral restriction limits speech 
based on the time, place, or manner of speech.20 Thus, U.S. courts apply a formal categorical approach; once 
the right to free speech is implicated, it weighs heavily.21 Additionally, legal scholar Halberstam argues the 
dominant conception of rights in the United States is a “motivational one.”22 Under this view, rights involve 
freedom from government intervention “motivated by a particular set of excluded reasons.”23 As a result, the 
                                                          
9 RANEY B. et al. eds., Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European Convention on Human Rights, 17 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) 484.  
10TUSHNET, M., The Constitution Of The United States Of America: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2015) 187, 
noting the very first amendments to the U.S. Constitution were explicitly “described as a Bill of Rights”.     
11 ABRAMS, F., The Soul Of The First Amendment (Yale Univ. Press 2017) 6.  
12 HABER, T. I. & EMERSON, D., Political And Civil Rights In The United States: A Collection Of Legal And Related Materials 
(Dennis & Co., 2nd ed. 1952) 4. 
13 CHEMERINSKY, E., Constitutional Law, Principles, And Policies (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2015) 968, clarifying, however, that 
many of the Constitution’s drafters helped adopt the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to punish “false, scandalous, and malicious 
writing or writings against the government of the United States…”. 
14 Id. 9.  
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
16 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (U.S. 1964). 
17 Id. 
18 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (U.S. 1925). 
19 CHEMERINSKY, E., supra note 13, at 976. 
20 EPSTEIN, R. A., The Fundamentals of Freedom of Speech, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 10 (1987) 53.  
21 HALBERSTAM, D., Desperately Seeking Europe: On Comparative Methodology and the Conception of Rights, 5 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 5/1 (2007) 168. 
22 Id. at 78. 
23 Id.  
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right to free speech is not absolute, but simply the right to speak without government interference “for bad 
reasons.”24 
Accordingly, U.S. Supreme Court calls for the strictest scrutiny for restrictions that “suppress, 
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because its content.”25 Simply because the court 
finds a content-based restriction, however, does not automatically render the restriction unconstitutional. 
Rather, the government may justify the restriction as necessary to avoid undesirable consequences of the 
speech.26 Therefore, state government restrictions that prohibit or limit speech, while authorizing criminal 
punishments for violations, must pass a strict scrutiny test.27  
The U.S. Supreme Court affirms the need to maintain open and free political discussion to ensure the 
government can respond to the peoples’ will. 28 “Silence coerced by law,” the court declared, is “the 
argument of force in its worst form.”29 As a result of these competing interests, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
developed complex jurisprudence balancing government interests and speech protections.  
 
a. A Brief History of Animal Rights Activism in the United States 
 
Undercover investigations in slaughterhouses and animal facilities in the U.S. have an infamous 
history. In the early 20th Century, Upton Sinclair’s exposé of Chicago’s meatpacking industry in The Jungle 
produced public outcry and prompted Congress to regulate animal products and slaughterhouse conditions.30 
Beginning in the 1990s, animal rights groups like Mercy for Animals, People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (“PETA”), and the Animal Legal Defense Fund (“ALDF”), aided by new camera technology, 
began posing as employees to conduct undercover investigations in animal facilities.31 These groups 
conducted over 100 investigations in the last fifteen years alone, collecting hours of graphic footage.32  
The video footage shocked viewers.33 Recordings showed workers dragging sick cows on cement 
floors, beating pigs with sledgehammers, and stomping chickens to death.34 Public outrage swiftly led to 
serious consequences. In 2012, a meat-packing company in California bankrupted and McDonalds refused 
to buy pork from producers who used gestation crates.35 
 
b. Ag-gag Laws in the United States: Silencing the Opposition 
 
The footage obtained through these investigations not only outraged consumers, but also producers. 
Panicked industry leaders rushed to their state legislatures for help in stopping what they compared to 
“terrorism… used by enemies for centuries to destroy the ability to produce food and the confidence in the 
food’s safety.”36 In 1990, Kansas became the first state to criminalize investigatory acts inside animal 
facilities: anyone who entered the facility “to take pictures by photograph, video camera, or by any other 
means… without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to damage the enterprise…” faced a 
class A nonperson misdemeanor.37 Since 1990, eight states passed similar civil or criminal legislation.  
A statute passed in Utah in 2012 criminalized “obtaining access to an agricultural operation under 
false pretenses” as a class B misdemeanor.38 In North Dakota, a law passed in 1991 allowed persons 
damaged by video recordings inside animal facilities to file a civil suit “to recover an amount equal to three 
times all actual and consequential damages.”39 Arkansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Montana all passed similar 
laws over the last two and a half decades.40 Together, these statutes effectively banned investigatory 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 CHEMERINSKY, E., supra note 13, 977, quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (U.S. 1994).  
26 Id. at 983, explaining that such a justification also requires the consequences be uniquely connected to the suppressed speech, and 
not also a consequence of the allowed free speech.  
27 Id. at 1015. 
28 New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, at 269, citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (U.S. 1931).   
29 Id. at 283. 
30 GENOWAYS, T., Close to the Bone: The Fight Over Transparency in the Meat Industry, New York Times Magazine, Oct. 5, 
2016.  
31 BERRY, Staff Attorney, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Guest Speaker at the University of Michigan’s Student Animal Legal 
Defense Fund Lunch Talk on Ag-Gag Law (Nov. 2, 2017). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 New York Times Editorial Board, No More Exposés in North Carolina, The New York Times, Feb. 1, 2016. 
35 BERRY, supra note 31; see also GENOWAYS, supra note 30.  
36 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 118 F.Supp.3d 1195, 1200 (D. Idaho 2015).  
37 KAN ANN. STAT. § 47-1827 (2017).  
38 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-112 (2017).  
39 N.D. CENT. CODE  §§ 12.1-21.1-01, 12.1-21.1-05 (2017). 
40 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Taking Ag-Gag to Court, http://aldf.org/cases-campaigns/features/taking-ag-gag-to-court [Accessed 
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activities by criminalizing unauthorized entry, entry by misrepresentation, film or photography inside 
facilities, and interference with animal production.41  
 
2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
 
The Council of Europe (“Council”) self-identifies as Europe’s leading human rights organization.42 
Founded on May 5, 1949 to promote democracy, the Council currently boasts forty-seven member states, 
including all twenty-eight EU member states.43 Operating independently from the EU, the Council focuses 
on human rights, rule of law, and democracy work. Most importantly, Council member states created and 
ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly known 
as the European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”).44  
 
a. The Object and Purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The Convention entered into force in 1953.45 Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Convention aimed to achieve unity, prevent a second Holocaust atrocity, and protect states from 
communism.46 As a result, drafters focused on rights within “the sphere of freedom of the individual vis-á-
vis the [g]overnment,” whose implementation established a duty of governments to refrain from interfering 
with their exercise.47 The Convention’s Preamble48 recognizes the delicate balance between the democratic 
nature of member state governance, and common observance of human rights in the Convention. It affirms 
the “like-mindedness” of European nations, whose shared tradition allows them to work together “for the 
collective enforcement” of the rights.”49 Such collective enforcement requires broad application; all member 
states must secure to all individuals in their territorial jurisdiction, residents and non-residents alike, the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention.50   
To ensure member states’ compliance, the Convention established the permanent European Court of 
Human Rights (“Court”).51 The Court’s jurisdiction applies to “all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention” and subsequent protocols.52 Final judgments by the Court bind member 
states; the Committee of Ministers supervise their execution.53 Importantly, non-compliant states may be 
brought back to the Court for failing to implement a judgment.54  
 
a. Freedom Of Expression Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The Convention protects the “right to freedom of expression” under Article 10:  
 
Everyone has a right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers…55 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
26 Dec. 2017]. 
41 See N.D. CENT. CODE  §§ 12.1-21.1-01, 12.1-21.1-05 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-112 (2017); KAN ANN. STAT. § 47-1827 
(2017). 
42 Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are  [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017]. 
43 Our Member States, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are  [Accessed 21 May 2017]. 
44 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
45 The European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts  [Accessed 12 Dec. 2017]. 
46 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 3-4. 
47 VAN DIJK, R., et al. eds., Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia: Antwerpen – Oxford 
4th ed. 2006) 6.  
48 European Convention on Human Rights, pmbl (broadly affirming the drafting parties and subsequent member states’ belief in 
“those fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by 
an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and the observance of the Human Rights upon which 
they depend”). 
49 Id. 
50 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 6, 17; See also Section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, arts. 1-18.  
51 Id. art. 19 “Establishment of the Court”; See also RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, 17 (having the largest territorial jurisdiction in 
the world, the Court covers over 47 member states and over 800 million people).  
52 European Convention on Human Rights, art 32. 
53 European Convention on Human Rights, art 46; RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 5. 
54 See Case of Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland, No. 32772/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 30, 2009), holding that 
Switzerland “failed to comply with their positive obligation under Article 10” after the Swiss Federal Court failed to order the 
commercial’s broadcast after the Court’s initial judgment.  
55 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 § 1.  
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The freedom of expression protects both the content of the expression and the communication itself, 
covering anyone involved in the making of the protected communication.56 While the text of Article 10 
protects opinion expression, the Court’s caselaw unconditionally protects the communication of facts, even 
if the facts turn out not to be true.57 As a result, many forms of expression, including books, film, video-
recordings, information pamphlets, and the internet, are protected.58 Because the Convention allows states to 
limit expression via restrictions “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society,” 59 questions of 
necessity and proportionality underlie the Court’s assessment of states’ domestic restrictions.  
 
b. Analyzing Member State Violations Under Article 10 of the Convention  
 
The European Court of Human Right’s case law affirms the special role “freedom of expression” 
plays in both in protecting democracy and other Convention rights.60 With these purposes in mind, the Court 
developed principles to ascertain whether member state restrictions on the freedom of expression are 
permissible under the restrictions clause of Article 10.61 In addition to the requirement that each restriction 
be “prescribed by law,” “necessary in a democratic society,” and satisfy one of the listed interests, the Court 
requires they be strictly construed and convincingly established.62 Such construction “implies the existence 
of a ‘pressing social need.’”63  
When examining a restriction, the Court assesses the proportionality of the restriction to the alleged 
pressing social need with the whole case in mind, balancing the restriction and “the legitimate aims 
pursued” in their proper contexts.64 In applying a margin of appreciation and recognizing that “the essence 
of democracy [requires] diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated…”65 the Court 
acknowledges member state diversity. But, the deference granted to member states has its limits. For 
example, the Court has held “there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 for restrictions on debates on 
questions of public interest.”66 Finally, even a necessary, pressing, and legitimate interference must be 
construed strictly and established convincingly, in particular “when the nature of the speech is political 
rather than commercial.”67 
 
c. Freedom of Expression for Animal Rights Activists and Organizations 
 
In the following cases, the Court specifically assessed restrictions which allegedly violated Article 10 
by suppressing activists’ ability to express pro-animal views. These cases highlight how the Court assesses 
whether the government sponsored restriction, prescribed by law, can withstand scrutiny as a legitimate 
exception under section 2 of Article 10. In this way, the Court’s analysis follows the object and purpose of 
the Convention itself, balancing the need for member states to manage an effective political democracy 
against the Convention’s aim to protect the very human rights on which member state democracies 
depend.68 
 
3. ANIMAL OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
U.S. federal law defines animal agricultural operations to include “the production and marketing of 
agricultural commodities and livestock.”69 The federal definition of agricultural product includes “any 
agricultural commodity or product, whether raw or processed, including any derived from livestock that is 
                                                          
56 GRABENWARTER, C., European Convention on Human Rights Commentary (C.H. Beck 2014) 253. 
57 Id. 
58 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 484. 
59 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10. 
60 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 486. 
61 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 § 2: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.” 
62 VAN DIJK, P. et al., supra note 47, at 774.  
63 GRABENWARTER, C., supra note 56, at 262.  
64 VAN DIJK, P. et al., supra note 47, at 775.  
65 Case of Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. & Di Stefano v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 129 (June 7, 2012).  
66 Animal Def. Int’l, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 102 (citing Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (Nov. 25, 1996). 
67 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 66. 
68 See European Convention on Human Rights, pmbl. 
69 Information Gathering, 7 U.S.C. § 8791(b)(1) (2017).  
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marketed in the United State for human or livestock consumption.”70 These agricultural products—cows, 
pigs, and chickens—used in animal agricultural operations in the United States lack legal protections under 
federal law.71 U.S. federal law defines animal agricultural operations to include “the production and 
marketing of agricultural commodities and livestock;”72 agricultural products include commodities “whether 
raw or processed…derived from livestock that is marketed in the U.S. for human or livestock 
consumption.”73  
Agricultural animals fare no better under state law, as many exempt “livestock,” “production 
animals,” or “poultry” from their animal cruelty statutes.74 As a result, the public must voice their animal 
welfare concerns with its wallet. If treating animals humanely becomes economically profitable, industries 
will respond accordingly. Unfortunately, consumers wield little power in the animal agriculture industry 
because several obstacles prevent consumers from making informed decisions.  
The first obstacle, a lack of federal and state protections welfare protections for agriculture animals, 
leaves consumers without regulated humane alternatives. The second obstacle is a lack of information: 
consumers must rely on whistleblower information about animal cruelty because agricultural operations do 
not share videos or information about their activities. This reliance on whistleblowers makes the new wave 
of so called “ag-gag laws”—laws criminalizing many undercover investigation activities in industrial animal 
agricultural operations—all the more devastating. State governments’ active support of the animal 
agriculture industry threatens consumers’ access to information. When legislators respond to industry fears 
of exposure by reducing transparency, consumers and animals lose. 
 
a. Federal Protections for Agricultural Animals in the United States 
 
Few federal statutes address animal welfare. The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 (“Welfare Act”) and 
subsequent amendments regulate the sale, handling, and transport of dogs, cats, and research animals; later 
amendments regulate dog fighting and pet stores.75 The Welfare Act explicitly excludes agricultural 
animals.76 The Humane Slaughter Act of 1958 attempted to create a baseline standard for all animal 
slaughter in the U.S. The Humane Slaughter Act mandates that “no method of slaughtering or handling in 
connection with slaughtering shall be deemed to comply with the public policy of the U.S. unless it is 
humane.”77 It defines two slaughter methods as humane: one requires certain livestock be “rendered 
insensible to pain” before being “thrown, cast or cut,”78 while the other grants a religious exception to any 
faith slaughtering via “simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp 
instrument.”79 Importantly, any requirements for humane treatment throughout the animal’s life are absent. 
 
b. Federal Government Support of the Animal Agriculture Industry in the United States: Are Animal 
Activists Terrorists? 
 
Decades of federal government support of the animal agricultural industry in the U.S. reached an apex 
in 2006 with the passage of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“Terrorism Act”).80 The Terrorism Act 
subjects anyone who travels in interstate commerce with “the purpose of damaging or interfering with the 
operations of an animal enterprise… and causes the loss of any real or personal property… [or] conspires or 
attempts to do so” to varying prison sentences, fines, and restitution payments.81 By labeling any activities 
that interfere with animal enterprises82 or operations as terrorism, the Terrorism Act harshly punishes many 
                                                          
70 Food, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 § 2103 (1) Reporter 104 Stat. 3359. 
71 See Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 91 P.L. 579 (1970); See also Dogs, Cats, and Other Animals: Research or Experimental Use, 89 
P.L. 544 (1966).  
72 Information Gathering, 7 U.S.C. § 8791(b)(1) (2017).  
73 Food, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 § 2103 (1) Reporter 104 Stat. 3359. 
74 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(b)(ii)(C) (2017) defining “animal” to exclude “livestock, if… the conduct toward the creature, 
and the care provided to the creature, is in accordance with accepted animal husbandry practices.” Such accepted animal husbandry 
practices are not further defined; Cf.  IDAHO CODE § 25-3501A(3)(2)(b) (forbidding law enforcement from removing a production 
animal despite a violation without first obtaining written permission from a department investigator); See also MO. REV. STAT. § 
578.182(1)(3) and FLA. STAT. § 828.125(5). 
75 Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 91 P.L. 579 (1970).  
76 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2017) by defining the term “animal” to exclude “other farm animals, such as, but not limited to livestock or 
poultry,” the act does not cover any agricultural production animals. 
77 Humane Methods, 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2017). 
78 Id. § 1902(a). 
79 Id. § 1902(b). 
80 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 109 P.L. 374, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 43 (2006). 
81 Id. § 43(a)(1)-2(A). 
82 The term “animal enterprise” as used in the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act encompasses the agricultural operations as defined 
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activities already illegal under federal and state law only because of their relation to animal enterprises.83   
The Terrorism Act is a fearful government response to growing success by animal activist groups. 
Beginning in the 1990s, activists in the U.S. helped pass several animal welfare reform laws, including 
hunting bans in California and Colorado.84 Other activists pursued non-legislative strategies including civil 
disobedience, sabotage, and direct attacks on animal facilities.85 The federal government responded swiftly 
to calls from the animal agricultural industry to stop these activities with the Terrorism Act. States soon 
followed suit.  
 
CASE LAW ANALYSIS 
 
1. CHALLENGES TO AG-GAG LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, states passed sweeping legislation criminalizing activities commonly 
used by animal welfare groups to expose animal cruelty in slaughterhouses and production facilities.86 
While the Terrorism Act clarifies that it should not be construed “to prohibit any expressive conduct… 
protected from legal prohibition by the First Amendment,”87 state laws lacked similar protections. 
Unsurprisingly, challenges to these laws focus on the First Amendment.  
 
a. Alleging Actual Injuries and Standing to Challenge: People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Stein. 
 
In May 2017, a federal district court in North Carolina dismissed a First Amendment challenge 
brought by PETA and seven other organizations, including ALDF, against North Carolina’s Attorney 
General and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC”), for failure to show that they had 
suffered any real injury; thus, they lacked standing to bring a case against the state in the first place.88 On 
June 5, 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion, holding the district 
court erred in dismissing the claim.89  
 The case began when PETA challenged the constitutionality of North Carolina’s 2015 Property 
Protection Act (“Act”), which allowed animal facility operators to recover up to $5,000 per day in 
exemplary damages for “an act that exceeds a person’s authority to enter the non-public areas of another’s 
premises.”90 Qualifying acts included entering nonpublic areas for purposes other than doing business, as 
well as placing an unattended surveillance device to record inside the facility.91 
From 2001 to 2003, PETA discovered and publicized conduct involving lab animals in non-public 
laboratories at UNC.92 PETA planned to conduct similar investigations in the future and ALDF spent 
thousands of dollars on advertisements to recruit more investigators.93 Together, they alleged the Act 
prevented them from conducting investigations without fear of being sued for damages (fear of liability), 
and prevented them from receiving information obtained through the film footage (receipt of speech).94  
PETA alleged the law facially violated the First Amendment “because it constitute[d] a content-based 
restriction on speech and cannot pass strict scrutiny,” and sought an injunction against its enforcement.95 
The district court held they failed to demonstrate standing to bring their claims.96 In order to demonstrate 
standing, plaintiffs must show first either an injury-in-fact or threatened injury;97 the court found Plaintiffs’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
in the previous paragraphs and as discussed in this paper, see 18 U.S.C. § 43 Force, violence, and threats involving animal 
enterprises, at § (d)(1)(A) Definitions (defining animal enterprises as “a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells animals 
or animal products for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, education, research, or testing”). 
83 STUPPLE, A. T., Terrorism and the Animal Rights And Environmental Movements, Journal of Animal and Natural Resource 
Law, 11 (2015) 51.  
84 PACELLE, W., The Long Road to Animal Welfare: How Activism Works in Practice, Foreign Affairs, (July/Aug. 2015) 71. 
85 STUPPLE, A.T., supra note 83, at 61. 
86 Animal Legal Defense Fund, Taking Ag-Gag to Court, http://aldf.org/cases-campaigns/features/taking-ag-gag-to-court/ [Accessed 
26 Dec. 2017]. 
87 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 109 P.L. 374 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 43(e)(1) (2006).  
88 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Stein, 259 F. Supp.3d 369, 372 (M.D.N.C. 2017). 
89 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Stein, 2018 WL 2714684, *1 (4th Cir. June 5, 2018).  
90 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2017). 
91 Id. 
92 PETA, 259 F. Supp.3d, 373. 
93 Id. 
94 PETA, 259 F. Supp.3d, 376. 
95 Id. at 374.  
96 Id. at 375, 386. 
97 Id. at 375; see also Id. at 375, quoting Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) requiring for an injury-in-fact “a 
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claimed injuries of fear of liability or blocked receipt of speech insufficient.98 UNC had not yet acted—it  
was “purely speculative whether Defendants – or anyone else – will engage in the complained-of conduct of 
invoking the [law] against any Plaintiff.”99 As for the receipt of speech, the court found Plaintiffs “fail[ed] to 
allege that most of the information they seek actually exists at all;” additionally, the Act did not prevent 
Plaintiffs from discovering this information because it only prevented recording.100  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision.101 The Court emphasized 
PETA and ALDF’s long and successful tradition of using uncover investigations to fulfill their missions as a 
reason to believe the legislation targeted them specifically. 102 The Court also explained the relaxed standing 
requirement in First Amendment cases.103 To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, plaintiffs can simply 
show the challenged statute has “an objectively reasonable chilling effect” on their exercise of free 
speech.104 Because the Court found a credible threat of the ag-gag law’s enforcement against the plaintiffs, 
they sufficiently demonstrated an injury-in-fact and have standing to bring a claim under the First 
Amendment.105 Further proceedings consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s decision are pending.  
 
b. Speech Restrictions Aimed at Chilling Activism in Utah Overturned in Animal Legal Defense Fund 
v. Herbert. 
 
In 2012, a Utah state legislator introduced a bill he declared “motivated by a trend nationally of some 
propaganda groups… with a stated objective of undoing animal agriculture in the U.S.”106 Successful 
undercover investigations in California and Iowa resulted in both intense public backlash and legislative 
action, scaring the agriculture industry across the U.S.107 Utah’s ag-gag bill passed, containing four key 
provisions: the criminalization of obtaining “access to an agricultural operation under false pretenses,” and 
bans on different filming methods—bugging, filming after applying for a job with the intent to film, and 
filming while trespassing.108  
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, a federal district court in Utah concluded that all three 
plaintiffs had standing under the “chilling effects” standard109 and granted their motion for summary 
judgment.110 The court found the First Amendment applied to the ag-gag law in question because the First 
Amendment protects lies that “do not cause legally cognizable harm,” and “at least some of the lies 
criminalized by the [statute] retain First Amendment protection.”111 Next, restrictions on the creation of 
speech “are treated similarly to restrictions on speech itself” because “the consensus among courts is that the 
act of recording is protectable First Amendment speech.”112 The court also found both the lying and 
recording provisions restricted content-based speech, because both provisions require a prosecutor examine 
either the words or the video footage itself.113  
Therefore, the court found strict scrutiny applied, and the ag-gag law failed to withstand strict 
scrutiny.114 The state argued the law protected animals from diseases brought by outsiders, protected 
workers from exposure to animal diseases, and protected both animals and workers from injuries at the 
hands of unqualified workers.115 Unconvinced, the court referred to the legislative history and determined “it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest”; see also Id., quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 
(U.S. 1990) and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (U.S. 2014), requiring the threatened injury be “concrete 
in both a qualitative and temporal sense,” and “certainly impending” or at least a “‘substantial risk’ the harm will occur”. 
98 Id., at 384, 386. 
99 Id. at 378. 
100 Id. at 385-86. 
101 PETA, 2018 WL 2714684 at •1.  
102 Id. at *3. 
103 Id. at *4. 
104 Id. at *4, quoting Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2013).  
105 Id. at *6. 
106 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp.3d 1193, 1198 (D. Utah 2017). 
107 Id. 
108 Id.; See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (2017). 
109 The “chilling effect” standard refers to the Tenth Circuit Court’s three part test to assess standing for plaintiffs who allege injury 
based on a “chilling effect” of a restriction. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp.3d 1193, 1199 (D. Utah 2017) quoting 
Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1089-88 (10th Cir. 2006)). The court also found one plaintiff had standing 
because Utah had prosecuted her under the ag-gag law before later dropping the case. Herbert, 263 F. Supp.3d at 1200. 
110 Herbert, 263 F. Supp.3d at 1213. 
111 Id. at 1202-03. 
112 Id. at 1208. 
113 Herbert, 263 F. Supp.3d at 1210-11. 
114 Id. at 1213. 
115 Id. at 1211. 
Silent Slaughter: How freedom of speech and expression restrictions keep animal abuses hidden and stifle animal welfare… Mahalia Kahsay 
          Derecho Animal. Forum of Animal Law Studies, vol. 10/1          153 
     
  
is not clear that these were the actual reasons motivating the [law].”116 Even if the state’s rationale were 
legitimate, the state failed to provide proper evidence; narrowly tailored restrictions must be “actually 
necessary” and neither over nor under inclusive to achieve the state interest.117 Instead, the court found the 
restriction “perfectly tailored” to prevent undercover investigators from sharing animal abuses with the 
public.118 Accordingly the court found Utah‘s ag-gag law unconstitutional.119 The Utah Attorney General’s 
Office has stated it will not appeal the decision.120  
 
c. Protecting Free Speech but not Misrepresentation in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter and 
Animal Legal Defense v. Wasden. 
 
In 2014, Mercy for Animals captured a video of workers dragging a sick cow by its neck with a chain 
across an Idaho dairy facility.121 Negative publicity ensued, and the Idaho Dairymen’s Association 
sponsored a bill to create a new crime of “interference with agricultural production.”122 Some legislators 
commenting on the bill labeled undercover activists as “extremist groups” and “terrorists,” while others 
supported the bill because they believed in a “need to protect members of the dairy industry from 
undercover investigators.”123 The bill criminalized the act of obtaining employment in an agricultural 
facility by misrepresentation, as well as making video recordings of conduct in production facilities.124  
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, a federal district court found that Idaho Code § 18-7042 
“seeks to limit and punish those who speak out” about animal agriculture issues; the statute suppressed 
speech involving public interest topics.125 The too-broad statute created “a particularly serious threat to 
whistleblowers’ free speech rights” and “criminalize[d] recordings even when made by a person who is 
otherwise lawfully permitted to be there.”126 Because content-based speech restrictions are unconstitutional 
“unless they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest,” and the court failed to find proper narrow 
tailoring, the court declared Idaho Code section 18-7042 unconstitutional.127  
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower 
court’s decision in-part. The court held that while audio and video recording of facility operations and 
misrepresentation to enter a facility are protected speech under the First Amendment, misrepresentation to 
obtain records or employment are not so protected.128 The court upheld the permanent injunction against the 
overly broad entry by misrepresentation provision which criminalized innocent behavior and targeted 
specifically “falsity and nothing more.”129  The court also affirmed the unconstitutionality of the recording 
provision, defining it as a “classic example of a content-based restriction” under the strict scrutiny test.130 
Oppositely, the court found the misrepresentation to obtain records targeted behavior “long prohibited in 
Idaho,”131 and the provision on employment only criminalized misrepresentation to obtain employment by 
individuals with intent to cause injury to the facility.132 The court concluded that neither of these two 
misrepresentation provisions targeted behavior protected by the First Amendment.133 
 
2. CHALLENGES TO SPEECH AND EXPRESSION RESTRICTIONS IN EUROPE 
 
Animals used in agriculture in Europe benefit from more widespread and uniform anti-cruelty 
measures than animals in the U.S. For example, veal crates, pregnant sow crates, and laying hen battery 
crates—often considered the most cruel forms of confinement—are all illegal in the European Union.134 On 
                                                          
116 Id. at 1212.  
117 Id. at 1212-13. 
118 Id. at 1213. 
119 Id. 
120 Associated Press, Utah Won’t Appeal Undercover Farm Filming Decision, https://www.usnews.com/news/be st-
states/utah/articles/2017-09-08/utah-wont-appeal-undercover-farm-filming-decision [Accessed 15 June 2018]. 
121 Otter, 118 F. Supp.3d at 1199. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1200.  
124 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2017).  
125 Otter, 118 F. Supp.3d at 1201. 
126 Id. at 1208-09. 
127 Id. at 1207, quoting Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 680 (U.S. 1994).  
128 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2018).  
129 Id. at 1195-96, quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012).   
130 Id. at 1203.  
131 Id. at 1199.  
132 Id. at 1201. 
133 Id. at 1205. 
134 Council Directive 2008/119, of Dec. 18, 2008, Laying down minimum standards for the protection of calves, 2008 O.J. (L 10) 
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the other hand, free speech restrictions found in many European countries exceed those in the U.S. These 
restrictions include criminal liability for defamation in Germany,135 a prohibition on paid political 
advertising in the UK,136 and a federal constitutional provision Switzerland guaranteeing the impartiality of 
radio and television together with a legislative prohibition on religious and political advertisements.137   
 
a. Animal Welfare Commercials are not Political: Free Speech v. Political Speech in VgT Verein 
Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland. 
 
In Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, an animal welfare association claimed Switzerland 
violated its freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.138 The association claimed 
Switzerland’s responsibility for a broadcast company’s refusal to air their pro-animal welfare commercial on 
national television.139 Switzerland argued the Swiss legal restriction on political advertising qualified as an 
exception under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention because it protected the rights of others.140 The Court 
found an Article 10 violation.141  
The Swiss Federal Constitution guarantees the impartiality of radio and television, and the autonomy 
of programme creation,142 while the Federal Radio and Television Act prohibited political advertising and 
required advertising “be clearly separated from the rest of the programme and shall be clearly recognizable 
as such.”143 The company responsible for Swiss national television advertising found the applicant’s 
commercial had a “clear political character” and rejected it.144 Switzerland agreed, arguing their legal 
restriction on political advertising qualified as an exception under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention because 
it protected the rights of others.145 The Swiss Federal Court upheld the rejection.146 
The commercial in question contained two scenes. The first scene, against a backdrop of soft music, 
showed a sow building a shelter for her piglets in a forest.147 The second scene showed a crowded pig farm 
while a voice in the background compared the farm to a concentration camp and warned consumers about 
over-medicated meat.148 The commercial urged viewers to reduce meat “for the sake of their health, the 
animals, and the environment.”149  
The European Court of Human Rights ultimately found in favor of the activists. First, the Court held 
Switzerland responsible for the alleged violation because Swiss law effectively prohibited political 
speech,150 and the commercial qualified political because it “reflected controversial opinions pertaining to 
modern society.”151 Switzerland’s responsibility established, the Company’s refusal to broadcast the 
commercial qualified as an “interference by public authority.”152 The Court found this “prescribed by law” 
interference satisfied a legitimate government goal under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, namely 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(EC); Council Directive 2008/120, of Dec. 18, 2008 Laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs, 2008 O.J. (L 47) 
(EC); Council Directive 1999/74, of July 19, 1999, Laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens, 1999 O.J. (L 
203) (EC).  
135 See Case of Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, No. 45192/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 30 (Jan. 16, 2014); see Strafgesetzbuch [German 
Criminal Code] § 187.  
136 See Case of Animal Def. Int’l v. The United Kingdom, No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 3 (Apr. 11, 2013)’ see Communications 
Act 2003 (U.K.). 
137 See Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶  24, 28, 30; see also Schweizerisches Bundesgesetz über Radio und 
Fernsehen [Federal Act on Radio and Television] Mar. 24, 2006 (Switz.). 
138 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 3.  
139 Id. ¶ 8. 
140 Id. ¶ 60; see European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 § 2.  
141 Id. ¶ 79. 
142 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 24; Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [Switzerland 
Federal Constitution] art. 93.  
143 Id. ¶ 28; See Schweizerisches Bundesgesetz über Radio und Fernsehen [Federal Act on Radio and Television] Mar. 24, 2006 
(Switz.). The Swiss Federal Act on Radio and Television 784.40 was amended in 2006. This case was decided June 28, 2001 and 
involved a previous version. For section 18(5) of the Swiss Federal Act on Radio and Television as referenced by the case, see Vgt 
Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 21.  
144 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶¶ 11-12.  
145 Id. ¶ 60; See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 § 2.  
146 Id. ¶ 21 (reasoning the restriction prevented “financially powerful groups from obtaining a competitive political advantage”). 
147 Id. ¶ 10. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Eur. Ct. H.R.  ¶¶ 44, 45, 47, also finding the Convention requires “each Contracting State 
‘…secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in… [the] Convention.’” As a result, the Court 
concluded a State’s responsibility “may then be engaged as a result of not observing its obligation to enact domestic legislation”.  
151 Id. ¶ 50. 
152 Id. ¶ 48. 
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protecting the rights of others.153  
The restriction ultimately failed the Court’s proportionality test. The Court found the association was 
neither the type of politically powerful organization against whom Switzerland sought to protect her 
citizens, nor capable of engaging in public debate without access to television.154 Switzerland had failed to 
provide relevant or sufficient reasons to justify the restriction in this applicant’s case.155 As a result, 
Switzerland violated Article 10 § 2, and the Court afforded the applicant organization just satisfaction of 
20,000 Swiss Francs.156 
 
b. When Animal Welfare Ad Campaigns Become Political: Molding Democratic Visions Through 
Political Advertisement Restrictions in Case of Animal Defenders International v. The United 
Kingdom. 
 
In Case of Animal Defenders International v. The United Kingdom, Animal Defenders International 
(“NGO”) alleged the UK violated Article 10 after the British Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre 
(“Centre”) found the NGO’s advertisement political and accordingly prohibited its broadcast.157 The 
applicant NGO organized campaigns against the use of animals for science and leisure.158 These campaigns 
sought to change the law and influence UK parliamentary opinion and public policy; one such campaign 
titled “my mate’s a primate,” involved the advertisement at issue.159 The advertisement featured a girl in 
chains emerging from a cage, while messages about the mental capacity and genetic makeup of chimps 
appeared in writing on a blank screen.160 The advertisement ended urging viewers help stop this use of 
animals; at the end, the chimp replaced the girl in chains in the cage.161 
Section of 321(2) of the UK Communications Act 2003 prohibits advertisements which are “inserted 
by or on behalf of a body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature” or “directed towards a 
political end.”162 The same act also imposes “the statutory obligation of impartiality on all broadcasters” in 
the UK.163 The Centre argued the UK’s legal prohibition on paid political advertising required the 
advertisement’s rejection.164 The UK argued Parliament prohibited the broadcast of paid political 
advertisement to protect the impartiality of the democratic process qualified as an exception because it was 
“necessary in a democratic society.”165 The British High Court differentiated this case from the Court’s 
decision in VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, holding it had “turned on its facts” and did not apply to the case 
at hand.166  
The Court found the restriction resulted from “the culmination of an exceptional examination by 
parliamentary bodies,” all of which “found the prohibition to have been a necessary interference.”167 The 
Court also found the restriction proportionate and “specifically circumscribed to address the precise risk of 
distortion the State sought to avoid.”168 The prohibition, part of a greater regulatory framework involving 
the public interest, resulted from “the culmination of an exceptional examination by parliamentary 
bodies.”169 Thus, Court found prohibition a necessary interference – the UK had not violated Article 10.170  
 
c. Protecting Reputations in Tierbefreier v. Germany: When Freedom of Expression Threatens to 
Harm a Company’s Image. 
 
In Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, applicants applied for a civil injunction against the distribution of 
                                                          
153 Id. ¶¶ 51, 58, 61, 62.  
154 Id. ¶¶  75, 77. 
155 Id. ¶ 75. 
156 Id. ¶¶  79, 94, 95; See also, European Convention on Human Rights, art. 41: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of 
the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial 
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”   
157 Animal Def. Int’l, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 10. 
158 Id. ¶ 8. 
159 Id. ¶ ¶ 8, 9. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. ¶ 58; Communication Act 2003 (U.K.) 
163 Id. ¶ 63. 
164 Id. ¶ 10. 
165 Id. ¶¶ 88, 99. 
166 Animal Def. Int’l, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 14.  
167 Id. ¶ 114. 
168 Id. ¶ 117. 
169 Id. ¶ 114. 
170 Id. ¶¶ 114, 123. 
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video footage from an undercover animal research facility investigation violated their freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the Convention.171 One of the applicants, a journalist, began work a research facility that 
bred monkeys and conducted animal experiments.172 The journalist secretly filmed animals inside the 
facility, collecting over forty hours of footage.173 The journalist made one short film with the footage, 
criticizing the company’s treatment of animals, and multiple German broadcast companies aired this film.174 
The applicants used much of the same footage to make a second, longer film; this film claimed the company 
“systematically flouted” applicable laws and alleged staff treated animals harshly and cruelly.175  
Under Article 5 of section 1 of the German Constitution, every person has the right to “freely express 
and disseminate his opinions.” 176 The same section allows general laws to limit these rights to protect young 
persons or personal honor.177 Section 823(1) of the German Civil Code holds liable any person who 
“intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of 
another person.”178 Additionally, Section 187 of the German Criminal Code punishes defamation, which 
includes disseminating “a fact related to another person which may defame him or negatively affect public 
opinion about him” with imprisonment or a fine.179 Finally, German civil law allows people whose 
personality rights are at risk “to compel that other person to refrain from performing the impugned 
action.”180  
In this case, after the activists collected the secret footage, a German company contracted under the 
Animal Welfare Act to conduct an animal research applied for a civil injunction to prevent the applicants 
from disseminating film footage taken in their facility.181 Germany justified these restrictions under Article 
10 as necessary to protect the rights of others and to prevent of disorder or crime.182 The German Court of 
Appeals found the footage “could only be published if the information’s importance for the public clearly 
outweighed the disadvantages suffered by the injured party.”183 Because the applicants obtained the footage 
unlawfully and interfered with the company’s right not to be spied on, the court upheld the injunction.184 
 The European Court of Human Rights first acknowledged that both parties accepted the that civil 
injunction interfered with the applicants’ freedom of expression. Next, the Court concluded that the civil 
injunction against the footage qualified as an interference “prescribed by law.”185 This interference also 
pursued a legitimate aim under section 2 of Article 10: “the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others.”186 The Court acknowledged the need to provide special protection to questions of public interest,187 
but nevertheless found compelling the applicants’ use of unfair means in their so-called “battle of ideas” 
against the company.188 Ultimately, the Court found the German Court of Appeals “struck a fair balance” 
between the applicant’s freedom of expression and protecting the Germany company’s reputation.189 
Besides, as the German courts had already stated, the applicants were free to criticize animal experiments in 
other ways.190 The Court found Germany had not violated Article 10 under the Convention.191 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
1. FOUNDATION OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: SPEECH IS SPECIAL 
 
The right to express opinions and speak freely without government intervention is a critical 
component of a functioning democracy. Censorship allows governments to restrict information, propagate a 
                                                          
171 Case of Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, No. 45192/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 7, 12, 21 (Jan. 16, 2014).  
172 Id. ¶ 5.  
173 Id. ¶¶ 5-6. 
174 Id. ¶ 6.  
175 Id. ¶ 7. 
176 Id. ¶ 29; Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany] § 1 art. 5.  
177 Id. 
178 Id. ¶ 30; Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code] § 823 (1).  
179 Id; Strafgesetzbuch [German Criminal Code] § 187.  
180 Tierbefreier E.V., Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 31.  
181 Id. ¶¶ 5, 8.  
182 Id. ¶ 41. 
183 Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG Hamm] July 21, 2004, 3 U 77/04, ¶ 58 (Ger.).  
184 Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. 
185 Id. ¶ 48., A.,  
186 Id. ¶ 49; See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10 § 2.  
187 Id. ¶ 52. 
188 Id. ¶ 54, 56. 
189 Id. ¶ 59.  
190 Id. 
191 Id. ¶ 60. 
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tainted agenda, and misinform the masses. Many revolutionary constitutions abolished censorship and 
extended free speech and expression rights to the media; this suggests free speech encompasses “the right of 
all citizens to be informed.”192  
The European Court of Human Rights labeled the freedom of expression under Article 10 as “one of 
the essential foundations of a democratic society.”193 Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court argued the 
“safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.”194 Brandeis’ 
solution involved “more speech, not enforced silence.”195 Unsurprisingly, free speech in the U.S. under the 
First Amendment is popularly, although incorrectly, viewed in absolutist terms: free speech seemingly 
reigns above all else.196 
Surprisingly, republican state legislators in Idaho, North Carolina, and Utah, popularly known for 
touting small government ideals, passed sweeping legislation to restrict speech—lying and video 
recording—in animal production facilities. In these cases, private property and food industry interests easily 
trumped free speech concerns, at least according to state legislators. Only in court, when out-of-state animal 
welfare organizations challenged these restrictions, did free speech concerns take a central role in the 
debate. In New York City, investigative reports and op-eds sounded the alarm on states’ attempts to stifle 
speech, warning these ag-gag laws violated free speech rights and threatened transparency in the animal 
agricultural industry.197 The welfare of animals mattered now that Americans’ cherished free speech rights 
were threatened.  
In Europe, popular belief assumes Europeans accept greater free speech restrictions. The European 
Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”) itself explicitly allows states to restrict expression, despite the 
central role the freedom of expression plays in protecting other Convention rights.198 Restrictions are 
allowed so long as they are clearly prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society, and satisfy one of 
many specific objectives, including public safety, the protection of the rights of others, or national 
security.199 As a result, the Court upheld Germany’s injunction against a video that threatened the personal 
honor of a research company and the UK’s prohibition on paid political advertising, while rejecting 
Switzerland’s less convincingly reasoned, but very similar prohibition on paid political advertisements.200  
Procedural, historical, and contextual differences between Europe and the United States help explain 
the differences between freedom of speech and expression challenges by animal activists at home and 
abroad.  
 
2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION VERSUS FREE SPEECH CHALLENGES 
 
a. Procedural Differences Between the European Court of Human Rights and U.S. District Courts. 
 
Several procedural aspects differentiate “freedom of speech” challenges in the U.S. from the “right to 
freedom of expression” jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”). First, 
once jurisdiction is established, U.S. federal district courts examine ag-gag laws as first instance courts. The 
European Court, however, may only hear cases once the applicant has exhausted all domestic remedies in 
the state which allegedly violated their rights.201 This allows member states the chance to remedy an alleged 
breach, reaffirming the states’ role as part of the “machinery of protection” to guard human rights under the 
Convention.202  
Both systems lack jurisdiction to review a national law upon request. In the United States, plaintiffs 
need standing, either an actual injury or threat of injury, and in Europe persons who bring applications must 
have been “directly affected by an alleged violation” and may not “complain generally of certain 
legislation.”203 If admissibility is established, the U.S. courts use a categorical approach204 to assess free 
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200 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 512 (Importantly, the Court’s distinction between Tierfabriken and Animal Defenders 
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202 RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 34. 
203 PETA, 259 F. Supp.3d at 374; RAINEY, B. et. al., supra note 9, at 29, explaining Art 34, allowing “any person, non-government 
Silent Slaughter: How freedom of speech and expression restrictions keep animal abuses hidden and stifle animal welfare… Mahalia Kahsay  
 158         Derecho Animal. Forum of Animal Law Studies, vol. 10/1           
 
speech restrictions, while the European Court assesses the proportionality of government interests against 
free expression rights.  
 
b. Historical Background and Current Application: U.S. Categorical Approach Versus 
Proportionality in Europe. 
 
The proportionality principle originated in Germany, under Prussian administrative court judges, as a 
means to limit government action to “only those measures that were necessary for achieving its legitimate 
goals.”205 With individual rights not explicitly protected by a constitution, a formalist means and ends 
analysis introduced the idea of rights into German law to protect “natural rights,” while making the 
administration of law more efficient and rigorous.206 Historical struggles, including social reform sought 
through the French Revolution and the atrocities of World War II led to a conception of positive rights, 
explicitly spelled out in the Convention, which require government action to protect.207  
On the other hand, the U.S. Bill of Rights protected rights by first limiting the federal government, 
and later the states.208 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment protects speech from unconstitutional state 
restrictions,209 placing the courts in a defensive role of retroactively overturning unconstitutional state 
speech restrictions. While both the Convention and U.S. Constitution can limit government lawmaking, the 
European Court and U.S. federal district courts view their roles in remedying violations differently.  
In the U.S., a categorical approach to free speech restrictions developed in a system with strong 
textual rights protections. Over ninety years of free speech jurisprudence and a distrust of judicial discretion 
led the U.S. Supreme Court to create many rules, tests, and presumptions to assess speech restrictions.210 
This categorical approach applies a sort of “wholesale balancing at the level of defining general categories,” 
where the court balances the free speech right against other involved rights depending on the category of 
protected speech.211 In Utah for example, the court in Herbert found the government’s rationale insufficient 
under a strict scrutiny test, after finding a content-based restriction.212 This approach allows for government 
limits on certain categories of speech for public interest reasons, if proper justification is provided.213  
The European Court applies the principle of proportionality to ensure a member state’s restriction is 
reasonable. This requires the means by which a state hopes to achieve an objective be proportional to the 
means used to achieve it. In Europe, this ensures rights remain protected despite failures by member states 
to pass proper domestic legal protections, whereas the balancing test in the U.S. limits a possibly limitless 
reading of the First Amendment.214  
The history of Germany’s proportionality principle, however, does not provide a complete picture of 
the European Court’s balancing exercise and proportionality assessment. The framework of the Convention 
gives member states the responsibility to protect individual rights.215 The European Court simply examines 
whether a right is involved, and if so, balances the government’s interest against the protected right as 
defined in the Convention.216 Therefore, when applying a margin of appreciation, the European Court 
considers local conditions and circumstances.217 As a result, considerations may vary greatly, depending on 
the purpose of the member state’s restriction and the type of expression being restricted.218  
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c. How Context Shapes Outcomes, Despite Similar Restrictions, at the European Court of Human 
Rights and U.S. Federal District Courts. 
 
Both U.S. Federal District Courts and the European Court place great weight on context, examining 
closely legislative intent and the social/political power of the involved parties. Of the three cases examined, 
the European Court only found one violation. In Vgt Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, Switzerland failed to show 
its restriction proportionately achieved political neutrality objectives. Curiously, in Animal Defenders, the 
European court unjustifiably upheld a very similar UK regulation after failing to focus on the individual 
facts of the case and yielding instead to the state’s general reasoning for the ban. Rather than question 
whether calls for improved animal welfare regulations qualified as political, the Court assessed the general 
rationale for the ban, easily accepting the UK’s labeling of the commercial as political and subsequent right 
to regulate. A thoughtful legislature, properly researched ban, and lack of consensus in other European 
countries swayed the Court; the ban was upheld.  
In Idaho and Utah, the context in which the state restriction passed also played a decisive role. The 
district court judges relied heavily on legislators’ motivations for passing the ag-gag laws, and used their 
own statements against them to disprove the government’s post-hoc rationale for the laws. These judges in 
both Idaho and Utah pointed to the detrimental effects of previous undercover investigations, including lost 
profits, poor public image, and public outcry against the animal facility operators. Neither judge pretended 
as though the ag-gag laws suddenly appeared to enhance safety and hygiene measures. Because neither Utah 
nor Idaho could convince the court of their claimed intentions, the true motive—ending undercover 
investigations—made for relatively straightforward First Amendment violations. In Idaho, the appellate 
court found the federal district court had even gone too far; in North Carolina, the appellate court found the 
actual purpose of the ag-gag law played too small a role in the federal district court’s analysis.   
The social and political power of the parties also played a role in both the U.S. and Europe. In 
Tierbefreier, the opinion reads as though the European Court viewed the issue through the lens of a personal 
dispute between two parties, rather than a public debate involving information sharing and transparency. For 
example, the European Court outlined in detail the domestic courts’ rationale in upholding the civil 
injunction against the short film’s dissemination. Rather than discussing the need for open public debate, 
court characterizes the case as an intellectual battle of ideas. As a result, German defamation laws applied. 
Similarly, in the U.S. in PETA, the federal district court in North Carolina analyzed the issue from the 
perspective of two private parties, finding the law simply created a private right of action between two 
parties.  
In each case examined in this paper, financial resources and economic power also mattered. The 
European Court ruled against a large private Swiss broadcast company with government delegated power, 
and the U.S. district courts in Utah and Idaho sided against the powerful agricultural lobby and state 
government legislatures working in concert. In comparison, in North Carolina, the court initially found the 
eight national and well-funded non-profit organizations’ uninjured by the speech restriction in question, 
while the European Court viewed the private German research company on equal footing as the animal 
welfare organization.  
Intended effects also matter. In the UK, the Animal Defenders International created the commercial as 
a part of its campaign to change legislation and public policy regarding the use of animals. In Germany, the 
sensationalist accusations against the animal experiment company were found to increase the chances of 
criminality against the company. Alternatively, in Switzerland, Utah, and Idaho, the applicants/plaintiffs 
merely sought to educate the public about animal abuses, and the courts accordingly found the effects of the 
speech restriction themselves more compelling. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognizes its powerful role and treads cautiously in full 
recognition of member states’ responsibility to protect legitimate interests through democratically created 
regulations. As a result, the European Court questionably accepted the UK’s rationale, despite rejecting 
Switzerland’s similar ban, because the UK properly and proportionately regulated a legitimate interest. 
Should this holding create cause for concern in the United States? The current, hastily written and overbroad 
ag-gag laws make for simple cases, but will U.S. courts be able to rule against future, more subtly and 
strategically crafted ag-gag laws?  
Under Professor Halberstam’s conception of U.S. rights, likely not. Regardless of how the current 
U.S. approach to free speech jurisprudence is labeled, the complex combination of categorical analysis, 
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balancing considerations, and examining government motivations provides a powerful buffer against 
unconstitutional infringements when the government acts for bad reason.219 Created against the historical 
context of newfound independence and drafted as a negative right restricting the government, the First 
Amendment should be able to withstand even carefully crafted legislation. Any future ag-gag laws, passed 
under the familiar guise of public health and safety, will have been created for bad reasons – to silence 
speech and reduce transparency in the animal agricultural industry. The tried and tested First Amendment 
will continue to withstand attempts, made for bad reasons, to quell free speech. As a result, animal activists 
can continue to rely on the safeguards provided by the First Amendment to protect against future attempts 
by state legislators to suppress whistleblower activities in animal agriculture operations.   
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